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MANDATED BY HEAVEN?
This article attempts to explore the extent to which the concept of 
‘mandate from heaven’ was exploited by the Tay Son brothers to justify 
their uprising against the Nguyen family in southern Vietnam and the 
Trinh in the north.  The Nguyen and Trinh families each claimed to 
be the trustee of the Le dynasty of Vietnam.  This study traces the 
background of the Tay Son brothers who triggered the rebellion and 
explains the legitimacy of their uprising. It is significant to delve into 
this event as the Tay Son Uprising was the only one in Vietnamese 
history which brought down a legitimate dynasty, recognised by 
China.  In addition to using secondary sources written by scholars 
from China, Vietnam and the West, primary sources on genealogy, the 
royal edicts from the Institute of Sino-Nom Studies and the writings of 
the Western travellers who had the opportunity to explore Vietnam in 
the 19th century were consulted.
Keywords: Tay Son Uprising, Nguyen Hue, Mandate from Heaven, Nguyen 
and Le Dynasty.
Introduction
The Tay Son brothers namely Nguyen Nhac, Nguyen Hue and Nguyen Lu led 
an uprising in the Tay Son village in 1771.  According to the record by Philipe 
Binh, an emissary of the northern Vietnamese Jesuit comunity in the first 
decades of the 19th century, many called them the Tay Son brothers because 
they came from the village of the same name.1  The rebellion, therefore, is 
known as the Tay Son Uprising.  The insurgency was also known by other 
names such as khoi nghia Tay Son [the Tay Son Righteous Uprising]; cach 
mang Tay Son [The Tay Son Revolution]; phong trao Tay Son [the Tay Son 
Movement] and sometimes as Tay Son-Nguyen Hue. For the purpose of 
this writing, the name ‘Tay Son Uprising’ will be used when discussing the 
movement.
The Tay Son uprising was a cataclysmic event that greatly altered 
the 18th century Vietnamese political and social landscape.  It emerged during 
the period in which Vietnam had been partitioned into two parts along the 
Gianh River: the Trinh family controlled the north and the Nguyen family, 
the south. However, the uprising has not received the attention it deserves as 
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one of the major episodes of 18th century Southeast Asian and East Asian 
history as pointed out by Alexander Woodside.2 Yet, it could be argued that 
this rebellion inaugurates modern Vietnamese history.  Therefore, the Tay Son 
period is significant not merely because of the complex social dynamics that so 
profoundly shaped it, or its duration and enormous impact on the Vietnamese 
people.  It is important for making a point of historical rupture, even as its 
internal dynamics recapitulated fundamental themes that had long served to 
shape the trajectory of Vietnamese history as claimed by George Dutton.3
The motivation for this revolution was diverse. A common response 
to economic pressure and social injustice is a revolution.  Even minor natural 
disasters can sometimes lead to disastrous famines. Nguyen Khac Vien (2007) 
provides a conventional Vietnamese historian’s description of the revolt as the 
corruption of the feudal regimes and the rise of the peasantry whereas Tran 
Trong Kim (1992) focuses chiefly on the political and military events.  It 
marks one of the first acknowledgements of the Tay Son regime as a legitimate 
dynasty.  It is striking, however, that the author virtually ignores the causes of 
the rebellion. 
Based on her research findings, Li Tana (1998), tries to explain the Tay 
Son insurrection within the context of the Nguyen reign in southern Vietnam 
(Dang Trong).  The author argues that previous approaches to the cause of the 
outbreak of this rebellion impose modern ‘political myths and symbols’ on 
the past, often in the service of Marxism and nationalism.  Li Tana argues that 
rather than see the uprising as a manifestation of a general trend, it makes more 
sense to see it in its local context, in terms of the development and response 
to the Nguyen rule. Her argument is often compelling.  But once again, given 
that Li Tana is attacking the scholarship on the most discussed rebellion in 
Vietnamese history, Shawn McHale for instance, requesting more details from 
the author in order to contribute another piece of Vietnamese history especially 
during the reign of Tay Son.4
Thus, this article attempts to explore how the operation of the tributary 
system during the Sino-Vietnamese relations is of particular significance.  This 
article will argue more broadly by not just looking at the Tay Son uprising as 
a peasant movement but also examining the validity of the uprising within the 
concept of ‘mandate from heaven’ which was exploited by the Tay Son brothers 
to rationalise the uprising.  It is, therefore, timely that while not much has been 
written about it, this study will fill the gap by addressing the legitimacy of 
the Tay Son uprising in order to contribute another piece to the jigsaw in our 
understanding of Vietnamese history.
Tay Son – meaning ‘western mountains,’ the name referred to the 
village’s location near where the uplands rise from the coastal littoral near 
Qui Nhon in a kingdom then know to the Vietnamese as Dang Trong (the 
Inner Region), to the Europeans as Cochinchina.5  The ancestors of the Tay 
Son brothers were originally from Quynh Doi (Quynh Luu district in Nghe 
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An province). They were captured in 1653 by Thinh Duc (1653 – 1658) from 
the Nguyen rulers during the battle between the Nguyen and Trinh, two ruling 
families in Vietnam.  As prisoners of war, they were deployed as forced labour 
to explore and open military areas (don dien) in Hung Nguyen, Nghe Anh 
Province.6
The long span of Vietnamese history claimed that four generations 
before Nguyen Hue and his siblings had been in the area for some time.  At 
first, they settled in Tay Son Nhat, Quy Ninh district in the city of Quy Nho. 
However, when it came to the generation of Nguyen Phi Phuc (also known as 
Ho Phi Phuc), the clan had moved to Kien Thanh, Tuy Vien district (Kien My 
in Binh Thanh district in Tay Son) in the province of Binh Dinh.  Nguyen Phi 
Phuc, father of the Tay Son brothers was the leader of the Ho clan and was in 
the business of trading betel leaves and areca nuts. He was married to Nguyen 
Thi Dong.7  The Ho clan were the descendants of Ho Quy Ly, the famous late-
fourteenth and early fifteenth-century military official, who seized power from 
the declining Tran court (1225-1400), and set up an illegal government which 
briefly ruled the country before the 1407 Ming Dynasty invasion. However, 
the brothers adopted the family name of their mother’s ‘Nguyen’ clan to justify 
that they had family ties with the legitimate heir to the Nguyen rule in South 
Vietnam.8
According to the Vietanmese scholar, Tran Trong Kim, by claiming 
that they were from the ‘Nguyen’ clan, they had the intention of gaining public 
support for their cause.9  The attempt to justify the use of the surname ‘Nguyen’ 
was vital to the Tay Son brothers because the reign of Ho Quy Ly and later 
his son, Ho Han Thuong did not get the recognition of the people and is still 
considered a dark point in the history of Vietnam.  Vietnamese scholars like 
Ngo Si Lien (1400 - 1497), Ngo Thi Si (1726-1780), Le Quy Don (1726 -1784) 
and Phan Huy Chu (1782-1840) who wrote the Vietnamese official history 
condemned the coup by Ho Quy Ly.10  The offical court history of Vietnam, 
Kham Dinh Viet Su Thong Giam Cuong Muc (The Imperially Ordered Mirror 
and Commentary on the History of the Viet) recorded that the unpopular Ho 
Quy Ly, was linkened to Zhu Di (Emperor Yongle of the Ming Dynasty, 1402-
1424) who seized power from his nephew Zhu Yunwen (1399-1402).  Ho Quy 
Ly was blamed for the annexation of Vietnam by the Ming Emperor of China 
after he had learnt about the treason committed by Ho Quy Ly.11
The father of the Tay Son siblings realised that the sanctity of the 
family’s name could help them gain the respect of the people and enhance 
their status in society.  It was also a means to gain a foothold in Vietnam’s 
political arena because the prevailing practice of Confucianism in Vietnam 
defined its social and political order.  Confucianism emphasizes good character 
by keeping the relationship between human beings in heaven and on earth on 
good terms.  The followers are taught to remember their ancestors as though 
they are still around.  The teachings are a series of philosophies and etiquette 
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that teach exemplary human behaviour.  Thus, amongst the eight values of 
charity (ba de) are loyalty (zhong), pure heart (lian), politeness (chi) and 
trustworthiness (xin) of a people towards their country.  The Tay Son brothers’ 
reputation could be compromised by their notorious ancestor, Ho Quy Ly who 
executed a coup d’état and assassinated the heir of the Tran dynasty.  His cruel 
deed was frequent topic of conversation among the Vietnamese.  Therefore, the 
switch in surname from Ho to Nguyen was crucial.
Early Years of the Tay Son Brothers
Nguyen Phi Phuc was very concerned about his children’s education.  He 
provided sufficient education for them in the Yen Thai hamlet (Binh Khe 
district, Binh Dinh province) to ensure that they would become knowledgeable 
as well as to hone their leadership skills from young.  He realised that illiterate 
landlords found it difficult to become noblemen.  In those days, a Vietnamese 
landlord, for example, who did not spend his free time pursuing knowledge, 
might not be considered a nobleman.12  Such a belief was influenced by 
Confucius’ philosophy which emphasises that humans should have good 
morals and be humane to ensure peace and prosperity on earth.  High moral 
principles can be achieved through education to produce a gentleman (junzi) 
who puts the welfare of the country first before his personal interests.
The Tay Son brothers were fortunate to have the opportunity to 
receive guidance from a scholar named Truong Van Hien.  Truong Van Hien 
had fled to Yen Thai hamlet to avoid getting involved in the political power 
struggle between his best friends Truong van Hanh and Truong Phuc Loan. 
Truong Van Hien was asked by Truong Van Hanh to write a letter of appeal 
to Lord Nguyen Phuc Thuan (1765-1778) to capture Truong Phuc Loan and 
his followers.  However, Truong Van Hien chose to avoid the palace power 
conflict.  He fled to Yen Thai hamlet where he met up with Nguyen Phi Phuc. 
Truong Van Hien could sense the special traits of the Tay Son brothers.  Hence, 
he gave them his full devotion and guidance in the areas of learning including 
the appreciation of poetry, books of literature and the arts of war and self-
defence.13
Of the three brothers, Nguyen Hue was the most prominent 
intellectually and in his leadership skills. Nguyen Hue was portrayed as having 
a firm and loud voice, curly hair, thick skin and a sharp vision. His strength was 
such that he could carry a tonne (1000kg) of rice on his shoulder.  In addition, 
he was quick to grasp what was taught by Truong Van Hien.14  Encouraged 
by Truong Van Hien, Nguyen Hue devoted himself to studying military and 
martial arts.  In all fields, he proved to be so brilliant that Truong Van Hien, 
experienced and presumptuous as he was, could not but be astounded.  Greatly 
impressed, Truong Van Hien encouraged Nguyen Hue to rise up against the 
corrupted authorities in order to save the miserable people.  He also called 
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upon Nguyen Hue to “ hold up the flag of Tay Son Uprising to save the nation; 
to raise oneself to be a famous emperor in order to capture the hearts of the 
masses.”15  The eldest, Nguyen Nhac, on the other hand, was seen as a stubborn 
and ruthless politician.  However, the few years he had spent in the civil service 
as a tax collector (tam bien lai) in Van Don had acquainted him with certain 
scholar-officials on whom he could later call to lend support to his movement.16
In addition, his experience as a betel nut trader had given him the 
opportunity to conduct business with minority groups such as the Cham and 
Tehir tribes in the highlands.  He even got to marry Thi Hoa, the princess of 
the old royal kingdom of Champa.  By inducing the Cham princess to join 
their movement, the Tay Son brothers were able to bring a sizeable number 
of Chams into their army.  For the Chams, the Tay Son Uprising might have 
presented an opportunity to restore some of their former political strength 
while for the Tay Son siblings, the Chams and Tehir semi-autonomous political 
centres constituted an alternative site of political power to be drawn upon in 
their struggle with the Nguyens.17  Thus, the marriage of Nguyen Nhac was not 
only seen as uniting the lowlanders, represented by the Kinh and Thuong tribes 
but also as gaining the support of the upland community, represented by the 
Tay tribes.  He now turned to them for an absolutely essential requirement of 
the rebellion: a well-sheltered base where government troops rarely ventured.18
From 1695 to 1771, there were several insurrections; the ethnic 
minorities in the highlands and the traders had risen four times to revolt against 
the Nguyen ruler.  In 1695 a trader named Linh succeeded in conquering 
Quang Ngai and Qui Nhon. In 1708, the Baria minority rose to rebel. In 1747, 
a trader named Ly Van Quang together with 300 minority groups conquered 
Bien Hoa, and in 1770, the Ser minority rebelled in Quang Ngai.19   It was then 
not suprising that the Tay Son brothers could easily gain support from a diverse 
group of Vietnamese when they claimed that the reason for their uprising was 
to get rid of the corrupted and greedy officers.
Examining The Causes of the Tay Son Brothers Uprising
The Tay Son brothers’ principle and main slogan was to steal from the rich to 
give to the poor (lay cua nha giau ghia cho dan ngheo).  Nguyen Van Nhac 
who regularly met with the people had the opportunity to see their suffering 
as a result of the officers’ greed.  Truong Buu Lam claimed that Nguyen 
Nhac’s experience in public administration gave him room to persuade the 
scholars and civil servants to support him.20  Ultimately, in every village which 
was conquered by the Tay Son brothers, the greedy landlord and corrupted 
government officials were punished and their properties forfeited. Le Roy 
writes: 
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Those southern men (Nguyen Hue’s troop) had applied strictly the 
regulations – they [Tay Son Brother] executed the thieves or those 
who were prosecuted as thieves. Everybody was pleased with such 
punishment, and the righteousness of the Tay Son’s troop was 
admired.21
Truong Buu Lam stated that the slogan which served as a warning, quickly 
became the most effective slogan of the Tay Son brothers.22  For instance, in 
Southern Vietnam (Dang Trong), due to rising taxes and widespread corruption, 
they had the full support of the people of Dang Trong.23  Scholars like Nguyen 
Khac Vien and Li Tana also recorded that the main factor for the uprising was 
the outrageous increase in the taxes.  The Nguyen rulers increased the rental 
tax in 1723, 1725, 1728, 1740 and 1760.  In 1770, they further increased the 
tax revenue by taking as much as possible especially from the traders.  The 
records of Cao Xa village in Thuan Hao province (near Hue) showed that out 
of 53 registered adults residing there, while nine were exempted, the other 
44 paid taxes every year, totalling 138 strings of coins (the price of a large 
buffalo was 40 strings in difficult times).  Not counting contributions in kind, 
the Nguyen court collected yearly between 338 000 and 423 000 strings of 
coins, between 840 and 890 ounces of gold, and many thousands of ounces of 
silver.  Li Tana and Nguyen Khac Vien pointed out that for every sum collected 
for the country, the officials took twice as much for themselves.24  The circle 
of those in power were the landlords and the nobles who collaborated to reap 
profits from the blood and sweat of the people.  To the powerful, gold was sand 
and rice was mud.25
Li Tana argues that the Tay Son Uprising was not a “peasant 
movement” but rather a “provincial revolt,” characterized by the substantial 
involvement of disaffected upland groups.26  The uprising, though generally 
described as an insurgence to restore the rights of the peasants who had been 
robbed and oppressed by the feudal lords, it succeeded in garnering over three 
thousand supporters, comprising not only peasants but also other commoners 
who had long been plagued by poverty and social depravity.  Charles Maybon 
(1919) and Tran Trong Kim (1992) disagreed. They believed that the reason 
of social depravity as claimed by Nguyen Nhac was made up only to justify 
his act of rebellion against the Nguyen ruler.27 Instead, they believed that it 
was Nguyen Nhac’s personal reason that was the main factor for the uprising. 
This is because Nguyen Nhac, a tax collector, had squandered the tax he had 
collected on gambling.28 He then brought his brothers to seek refuge in the 
hills and live in exile for fear of being punished by the authorities for breach 
of trust.29
Whatever the reason, what is obvious is that the movement garnered 
support from various groups; the ethnic minorities in the highlands, scholars, 
mandarins, village administrative officers, rich traders such as Huyen Khe 
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and Nguyen Thung from Qiu Nhon and the Chinese merchants.  In Thomas 
Hodgkin’s opinion, the Tay Son brothers achieved this through legitimising 
their rebellion by spreading the decree that their mission was to liberate the 
people from the clutches of the tyrannical Truong Phuc Loan and to give 
support to Nguyen Phuc Duong, Prince Nguyen Phuc Khoat, who was exiled 
by Truong Phuc Loan, as their vituous Nguyen ruler.30  In contrast, Truong 
Phuc Loan’s government was labelled as being illegal, harsh, corrupted and 
the main cause of the chaos in Vietnam.31  His untold wealth was depicted 
as the gold, put out to dry after a flood, that covered the entire compound of 
his house.”32  Because of his injustice and corrupted ways, he was likened to 
Truong Tan Coi (Zhang Qinkuai), a minister during China’s Song dynasty who 
was cruel and oppressive.33  Apart from that, the Tay Son brothers also declared 
that they supported equality among the people in every aspect such as social 
and economic.34
Indeed, various theories have been advanced to explain the cause of 
the resistance movement by the peasants.  Among the well-known theories 
in the context of South-East Asia is the moral theory of economics by James 
C. Scott, the theory of rational farmers by Samuel L. Popkin and the theory 
of ‘state contest’ by Michael Adas.  When the case of the resistance of the 
Tay Son brothers is reviewed, Adas’ arguments appear to be admissible in the 
discussion.  Taking an approach between Scott and Popkin, Adas states in his 
work Moral Economy or Contest State (1980) ‘the role of ethical consideration 
cannot be denied in traditional economic relations but emphasises that its 
contribution is limited.  The most important element that characterises this 
economic relationship is the competition between all those involved in order 
to obtain as much as possible from the production of the farmers.  When they 
fail and discover that the means of self-defence is ineffective, they involve 
themselves in the resistance movement.’35
The relevance of this argument is seen in Vietnam where uprisings 
often occurred after the country was hit by devastating natural disasters such 
as famine, pestilence, drought or flood. For Wang Lida, the elements of politics 
and economy are prominent reasons.36   The oppressive economic condition 
and rampant corruption of the Nguyen rulers were the highlighted elements in 
legalizing the Tay Son Uprising. These elements led to moments of decline and 
instability of the government which presented a powerful weapon for the rebels 
to depose the rulers.  Such unwelcome elements, which beset the government 
of Vietnam, were also among the prominent features in the cycle of Chinese 
dynasties.  Surely the abundant presence of such elements would ultimately 
lead to the loss of mandate from heaven for the existing rule.  A ruling dynasty 
should follow the principles of benevolence (ren) such as the feelings of love 
and humanity that would make the policy beneficial to all the people in order 
to achieve peace and satisfaction in the universe under heaven (tian)Thus, as 
the rebels moved from village to village, they proclaimed to the rural society, 
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covering ninety-five percent of the country’s population, that they were not 
revolting but were sent from heaven to seek justice.  As it was claimed by Ngo 
Thi Nham (1746 – 1803), a dignitary of the Tay Son brothers, the rise and 
fall of the brothers was determined by heaven and it had nothing to do with 
the number of soldiers they had.37  In truth, the Tay Son brothers applied the 
Confucius philosophy to legitimise their uprising. However, another reason for 
resorting to the Confucius doctrine to justify their rebellion was the notion that 
the Tay Son brothers were originally from the highlands which the Confucius 
scholars claimed to be uncivilized areas (cho man di).  As Li Tana had 
analysed, to avoid the stigma of being labelled as uncultured, to gain support 
and to justify the validity of Dang Trong’s captivity, Nguyen Nhac portrayed 
the family as being related to the descendants of the ethnic Cham.  He used a 
red symbol on his flag and declared himself the king of Vijaya, the capital of 
Champa.  Moreover, Nguyen Nhac’s decision to use the ancient Cham capital 
of Vijaya as his own political centre clearly reflected this logic.38
According to Confucius’ teachings, as an offspring of heaven, a king 
is obligated to rule in a virtuous, just and wise manner while being responsible 
for ensuring a favourable quality of life for all the people. A divine mandate 
gave the Vietnamese emperor the right to rule, but it was based on his ability 
to govern and not his lineage.39  Should the king fail to fulfil his obligation, the 
mandate of heaven shall be withdrawn and the loss of mandate is mirrored 
in the occurrence of natural disasters such as floods and droughts.  In such a 
situation, the people are right to rebel and overthrow the king.  It is the will 
of heaven to justify a new government as being legitimate and recognized. 
Therefore, 
“Floods, droughts and other catastrophes are indicative of 
disharmony and the disapproval of heaven. They are sign that it is the 
time for cach mang or “change of mandate,” the literal Vietnamese 
expression for revolution.”40
The adoption in Vietnam of a Confusion bureaucracy ruled by a Son of Heaven 
led to the creation of a Vietnamese tributary system in Southeast Asia modelled 
on the Chinese Sinocentric system in East Asia.41  Thus, according to George 
Dutton, the Tay Son brothers had to brand their group as khoi nghia (righteous 
uprising), nghia quan (righteous troops), ong nghioa (righteous men), duc anh 
(virtuous brothers) and so on in order to gain the people’s support for their 
movement.42  They continued to use the doctrine even after they had gained 
support. In February 1774, a Spanish missionary, Diego de Jumilla, reported 
“they announced to the villagers that they were not bandits, but that they were 
carrying out a war to obey the will of heaven.” 43  A French missionary also 
reported that,  “[the Tay Son leaders] then spread a thousand tales of dreams 
and revelations of signs from heaven, which they said proved their mission.”44 
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In 1788, Charles Chapman reported that Nguyen Nhac had claimed that the 
rise of the Tay Son brothers was God’s will to make them  a means to free the 
people and to be raised as ruler.45
These early references make it clear that the rebel leaders were 
popularising their interpretation of the will of heaven at the very outset of 
their uprising.  These reports indicate that the Tay Son brothers continued to 
underscore the purported support of heaven and that they felt it important to 
make this point clear even to the European visitors.  Their insistence suggests 
that the Tay Son brothers saw this form of political legitimation as fundamental 
to their overall mission.
Triumph in South Vietnam
In the 18th century, Vietnam was divided between two ruling seignorial 
families.  The Trinhs in the north controlled the area centred on the Red River 
Delta with their capital at Thang Long (Ha Noi).  The south was ruled by the 
Nguyens, whose nominal authority extended into the Mekong Delta and their 
capital was at Phu Xuen (Hue). In 1771, the Tay Son brothers rose up against 
the Nguyen ruler and easily captured An Khe, the gateway between Qui Nhon 
and Trung Son highland in Binh Thuan.  An Khe was made their headquarters 
due to its ideal location in a remote area with narrow and dangerous passages 
which made it difficult for the ruling power to contain the rebellion at the 
early stage.  In addition, An Khe together with the coastal ports in Qui Nhon, 
bordering Campa to the south constituted an important trade route.  Its location 
was ideal for the collection of various items such as timber, iron, sulphur, 
horses and elephants from the highlands.46
The successful conquest of An Khe by the Tay Son brothers weakened 
the Nguyen family’s control of the uprising.  Their next move was to conquer 
the customs headquarters at the border area in Qui Nhon.  However, the spies 
for the Tay Son brothers reported that the Nguyen family was prepared to 
defend their fort in Qui Nhon which was tightly guarded.  This left Nguyen 
Nhac no choice but to use deception to sneak into the guarded fort.  He 
pretended to be captured by his soldiers who were supposed to have defected 
to the Nguyen army. Nguyen Khac Tuyen, the Governer of Qui Nhon kept him 
in prison while awaiting his sentence.  However, during the night, Nguyen 
Nhac’s soldiers came into the fort easily as its gate was already opened by the 
so-called traitors.  His troops attacked Qui Nhon and conquered it in 1773. 
This victory allowed Nguyen Nhac to declare himself as Tay Son Vuong (King 
Tay Son) and build a capital in Qui Nhon. The success of conquering Qui Nhon 
was attributed by Liang Zhiming to Nguyen Nhac’s intelligence in employing 
the strategies of Sun Tzu, a Chinese military strategist during the Spring and 
Autumn period (722-403).47
At the same time, this success was a stepping stone for the Tay 
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Son brothers to expand their power to areas along the coastline from Quang 
Nghia to Binh Thuan.  This early victory encouraged Nguyen Nhac to get his 
younger brother, Nguyen Lu to launch an attack on Gia Dinh (Sai Gon) via the 
sea.  Nguyen Lu was triumphant in his mission when his opponents, Nguyen 
Phuc Duong and Nguyen Phuc Thuan, were killed in the battle.  This forced 
the Nguyen ruler to flee to Bien Hoa to save himself.  However, the Tay Son 
brothers’ victory was only temporary as Do Thanh Nhan, Nguyen’s general 
managed to drive them away from Dong Son.  This forced the Tay Son brothers 
to abandon Gia Dinh but before leaving, Nguyen Lu seized all the food and 
belongings of the place and brought the loot back to Qui Nhon.  Then in 1774, 
the Nguyen family through General Tong Phuc Hiep won back Binh Thuan, 
Dien Khanh and Binh Khang.  This left the Tay Son brothers only the area from 
Phu Yen to Quang Ngai.48
However, by 1776, Gia Dinh was once again conquered by the Tay 
Son brothers through Nguyen Lu.  Everyone of the ruling Nguyen’s descendants 
was killed accept Nguyen Phuc Anh, the 16 year-old nephew of Nguyen Phuc 
Thuan who escaped to Ha-tien.  By 1778, the Tay Son brothers had conquered 
the whole of Quang Nam including Gia Din.  To justify their deed of wiping 
out the whole Nguyen family, they continued to try to convince outsiders such 
as Father Ginestar, a missionary from Spain, that the reason they rebelled was 
because “heaven had entrusted this kingdom to them,” whereby the kingdom 
in question was the Nguyen realm of Dang Trong.  They had been upset by the 
relationship between the West and Nguyen Phuc Anh who was supplied with 
war material and artillery by his Western ally.49
Having vanquished the Nguyen power, Nguyen Nhac ascended the 
throne with the title Thai Duc and built his capital city in Do Ban (Binh Dinh 
Province). Nguyen Hue was appointed general with the title Long Nhuong. 
In 1782, Nguyen Hue defeated Nguyen Phuc Anh’s troops.  After that, the 
domination of Gia Dinh alternated between the two sides until 1783 when the 
Tay Son brothers managed to cripple the entire troop of Nguyen Phuc Anh who 
was forced to flee to Phu Quoc Island (Con Dao) with the help of a French priest 
(Bishop of Adran), Bishop Pigneau de Behaine (1741-1799).50 The episode of 
Pigeau helping Nguyen Phuc Anh will not be discussed in this paper. 
Temporary Setback
In 1786, the Tay Son rebels turned their attention to North Vietnam to recapture 
the Nguyen territories occupied by the Trinh family.  Unfortunately for the Tay 
Son brothers, not long after that, they themselves were defeated by the Trinh 
troops led by Trinh Sam.  With the strength of 30,000 soldiers, he marched to 
Dang Trong with the excuse of helping the late Le family to overthrow Truong 
Phuc Loan. The Trinh army did not experience any great resistance in their 
march towards Phu Xuan.  The Tay Son brothers were defeated at the Hai Van 
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Valley (Tran Ninh Wall).  Consequently, Nguyen Nhac, worried that his men 
would face a two-pronged attack by the Trinh and Nguyen families, suggested 
to General Hoang Ngu Phuc of Trinh that he and his brothers were willing to 
assist the Trinhs to fight the Nguyen family.  The suggestion was well received 
and so an alliance was forged. Nguyen Nhac  was then acknowledged as a 
Trinh officer.51
On the other hand, Nguyen Hue tried to make peace with Tong Phuc 
Hiep from the Nguyen family.  Nguyen Van Chat, a messenger of the Tay 
Son brothers informed Tong Phuc Hiep that Nguyen Hue had always been 
impressed by his talent and sought his cooperation to defend their land from 
being attacked by the Trinhs.  He added that the Tay Son brothers’ mission 
was to support Nguyen Phuc Duong Trung and his heirs.  Needless to say, the 
greedy Trung Phuc Loan was killed by them.52
Indeed, the diplomacy ploy of the Tay Son brothers had two agendas. 
By allying themselves with both sides, the brothers not only had the time to 
strengthen their army but also managed to put both the Trinh and Nguyen 
families in a vulnerable state during this peace period.  Nguyen Nhac knew that 
the peace treaty was only temporary, so he continued to train his army, hiring 
new soldiers secretly while improving control of the castle at Don Ban as well 
as building new fortification with the intention of launching a new attack when 
the time was right.  The Tay Son brothers, led by Nguyen Hue, dealt a blow to 
Tong Phuc Hiep’s force which was unprepared and unable to fight back.  Tong 
Phuc Hiep together with his nephew fled to Phong Van.53
Triumph in North Vietnam
Meanwhile, Thuan Hoa, which was under the supervision of Pham Ngo Cau, 
a governer of Trinh, was stricken by famine while in Bac Ho (Northwest 
Vietnam), the situation resulting from the death of king Trinh Sam was still 
chaotic.  The king’s death in 1782 led to fighting between Trinh Can and Trinh 
Khai. Trinh Can, who ascended the throne as the crown prince, was only four 
years old.  He was the son of King Trinh Sam and his favourite concubine, 
Dang Thi Hue.  However, as soon as Trinh Sam died, Trinh Khai staged a coup 
against Trinh Can with the help of Kieu Binh and the court officials.54  Kieu 
Binh had control of the traditional elite soldiers who had been recruited from 
three provinces, namely Ha Trung, Thieu Hoa and Tinh Gia in Thanh Hoa 
(Nghe An Province).  The court officials were highly respected by society as 
they were originally from the Le’s ancestral home.  In addition, the fact that 
they were the first scholars to support the Trinhs gained them the trust and 
support of the local society.
However, gradually, the involvement of Kieu Binh and the higher 
officials in robbery and murder went out of control, causing suffering and 
anguish among the folks of Bac Ha.  Under such circumstances, to determine 
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the heir to replace Trinh Sam, Trinh Khai and Trinh Can were pitted against 
each other.  The residents in particular the poor and the peasants, who had 
suffered because of the civil war, were also unfairly burdened with heavy 
taxes, although they enjoyed freedom under the governance of Trinh Sam.55  It 
was even worse when in 1786, famine fell upon Bac Ha.  Kieu Binh’s abuse 
of power on top of the economic burden and natural disaster endured by the 
people was exploited by the Tay Son brothers.  They realized that what seemed 
like an insignificant situation of poor irrigation systems and drainage but which 
had direct impact on the people’s lives provided them with the best opportunity 
to establish their authority with a claimed mandate from heaven.
That was not all. Nguyen Huu Chinh, former general of the Trinh 
family also urged the Tay Son brothers to intervene in the political affairs in 
Dang Ngoai.  His main reason was his disappointment with the Trinhs’ failure 
to keep their promise to proclaim the late Le’s heir as kind.  Instead, he saw 
the struggle for power and widespread corruption among the Trinh officials.56 
Initially, Nguyen Hue was reluctant to act especially without any instructions 
from Nguyen Nhac.  Nguyen Huu Chinh insisted that ’what was to be obtained 
would be his (Nguyen Hue’s) returns, and in a critical situation, what was more 
important was to gain something from the defeated.57   He continued that in a 
war, the commander should have more power than the king. He also pointed 
out that the Trinh ruler was, after all, a despot.  The people hated him and given 
all these reasons, it was vital for Nguyen Hue to overthrow the Trinh in favour 
of the heir of the late Le.58
Eventually, at the instigation of Nguyen Huu Chinh, in April 1786 
Nguyen Hue and his men marched across the Gianh River and came to Thang 
Long on 21st July 1786.  Nguyen Hue took only ten days to conquer Vi Hoang, 
Pho Hien dan Thang Long.  This drove Hoang Nghia Ho, Trinh’s general to 
commit suicide.  News of the fall of Thuan Hoa upon their reaching Thang 
Long triggered a series of rebellion, such as, in Quang Yen, Kinh Bac, Thai 
Binh and Tuyen Quang.  Meanwhile, Nguyen Huu Chinh’s troops marching 
along Viet An estuary managed to get into Nghe An which was abandoned by 
Bui The Tuy, prince of Bui The Dat.  Earlier, Ta Danh Thuy, Trinh’s general 
had left Thanh Hoa. Nguyen Huu Chinh’s troops arrived at Vi Hoang, the last 
of Trinh’s stronghold before Thang Long was conquered by Nguyen Hue.  A 
fierce battle with artillery fire from the sea and from the junks brought in by the 
Tay Son brothers ensued.  In the end, the Trinh army was defeated in Son Nam 
(Hung Yen).  This victory was achieved through the Tay Son brothers’ ruse 
which made the enemy troops attack the wrong target.  The trickery caused 
their opponents to run out of ammunition and in the end they were forced to 
surrender.  The failure of defending Son Nam was an early sign of Trinh’s 
defeat in Thang Long, the capital and administrative centre of the Trinh’s 
family.59
Wide Support for the Tay Son Brothers 
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The capture of Thang Long basically signifies the crippling of the Trinh 
family power in northern Vietnam (Dang Ngoai). This victory was deemed 
by Craig Lockard as the success of the Tay Son brothers to unite the north 
(Dang Ngoai) and the south (Dang Trong) of Vietnam after the span of 299 
years of its history.60  Nguyen Hue owed his success to the support of the 
generals like Tran Quang Dieu, Vu Van Dung, Dang Tien Dong and Ngo Van 
So. Ngo Van  So, for instance, in a discussion with Nguyen Hue observed 
that, ‘From ancient times until the present, nothing under heaven had been the 
private possession of any particular family; if one had the ability to take it, he 
should go ahead and do so.’61  In Thang Long, he managed to win the hearts 
and minds of talented scholars such as Ngo Thi Nham, Phan Huy Ich, Nguyen 
The Lich, Doan Nguyen Tuan and Nguyen Thiep who were dissatisfied with 
the dynasty of Le-Trinh.  According to George Dutton, the people’s sentiments 
in Dang Ngoia were such that they perceived the Trinh ruler as an ‘outsider’ 
which provided them the reason to throw their full support behind the Tay Son 
brothers.62
Over in Phu Xuan, Nguyen Hue received full cooperation from 
Tran Van Ky, a renown intellect who helped in preparing the administration 
and defence.  As promised to the people of Vietnam at the beginning of the 
movement, the Tay Son brothers had achieved the goal to restore the Le 
dynasty’s heir to the throne.  Hence, Le Hien Tong who had reigned under 
the domination of the Trinh family since 1740 was finally recognized as king 
in his own right by the Tay Son brothers although his power was to run only 
official state ceremonies and protocol.  As a reward, on August 1st, 1786, Le 
Hien Tong conferred Nguyen Hue the title of Nguyen Soai Uy Quoc Cong 
(Generalissimo and Mighty Grand Duke) and even gave his princess, Le Ngoc 
Han to Nguyen Hue in marriage.  While Nguyen Hue succeeded in restoring 
the throne to the Le’s heir in Dang Ngoai, his brothers conquered other parts 
of Vietnam. Nguyen Hue dominated the north from Pass of Clouds (between 
Hue and Da Nang) to Thanh Hoa with the title Bac Binh Vuong (King of the 
Pacified North); Nguyen Nhac, who conquered the middle with his capital city 
established at Qui Nhon, was titled Trung Uong Hoang De (Centra Emperor); 
and Nguyen Lu, who conquered the south and presided over Gia Dinh, took the 
title  of Dong Dinh Vuong (King of the Settled East).63
According to George Dutton, the act of Nguyen Nhac in naming 
himself as king, in fact, indicated that the Tay Son brothers wanted to sever 
all political and military ties with the administration of the Nguyen and Trinh 
families.64 In other words, the brohers wanted to rule Vietnam independently. 
However, the fledging government established by the Tay Son brothers was still 
incapable of establishing relations with any power outside the country other 
than within Vietnam (Dang Trong dan Dang Ngoai). Charles Chapman even 
observed that the administration of Nguyen Nhac was still unstable because,
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While Ignac [Nguyen Nhac] himself admittedly has abilities, the 
officials, ill-seconded by the Mandarins who govern under him, are 
all lowly illiterate men chosen from amongst - the inhabitants of 
his native village of Tyson [Tay Son] who, as soon as they have got 
into power, have been remarkable only for their perfidy, cruelty and 
extortion, and are far from acknowledging their dependence on the 
hand that has raised them.65
Successive Take-overs of Thang Long
In 1787, Nguyen Phuc Anh had the opportunity to be active again at Gia 
Dinh. Nguyen Hue and his troops had to return to Dang Trong leaving all the 
administration to King Le Hien Tong.  By July 1786, Le Chieu Thong (titled 
Le Duy Ky after ascending the throne, 1765–1793) was appointed as Giam 
Quoc (Head of State) to replace Le Hien Tong who had died.66  Unexpectedly, 
Trinh Bong and Trinh Le appeared and each claimed to be the heir of the Trinh 
family.  This led Le Chieu Thong to appoint Trinh Bong as a Trinh dignitary to 
curb the uprising that followed the claims.  Not long after, Trinh Bong came to 
be known as the most powerful and greedy dignitary in Dang Ngoai.  Then Le 
Chieu Thong had to seek help from Nguyen Huu Chinh, Governer of the Tay 
Son brothers in Nghe An to exile the remnants of the Trinh army.  Nguyen Huu 
Chinh led his army to Thang Long and succeeded in humbling Trinh Bong. 
However, after gaining power in Dang Ngoai, Nguyen Huu Chinh tried to free 
himself from the control of the Tay Son brothers. Once again, Dang Ngoai 
was in a crisis over throne succession.  This led Nguyen Hue to instruct his 
admirals, Vu Van Nham and Ngo Van So to take over Thanh Long by killing 
Nguyen Huu Chinh.
In turn, Vu Van Nham who was entrusted to look after Thang Long 
also abused the trust place in him after Nguyen Hue returned to Dang Trong. 
Once again, Nguyen Hue was forced to order General Ngo Van So and General 
Phan Van Lan to Thang Long to overthrow Vu Van Nham.  Next, Phan Van Lan 
was appointed govern Dang Ngoai.  The coups happened constantly among 
the generals because there were hints of disunity and disintegration among 
the Tay Son brothers’ troops.  The disintegration was obvious when Nguyen 
Nhac and Nguyen Hue worked out their differences in the battlefield.  In 1787, 
when Nguyen Hue moved his troops to Thang Long, Nguyen Nhac who felt 
threathened, ordered his brother to return to Gia Dinh.  When Nguyen Hue’s 
army approached Qui Nhon, Nguyen Nhac’s army besieged them for about 
three months until they ran out of food supplies.67  The dispute was soon taken 
advantage of by Le Chieu Thong to free himself from the shackles of the 
Tay Son brothers.  With the intention to free himself from the control of the 
brothers in November 1787, Le Chieu Thong moved his soldiers in preparation 
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to capture Thang Long in the following month. 
End of Le Dynasty 
While Nguyen Huu Chinh was captured by the Tay Son brothers, Le Chieu 
Thong managed to slip away to Kinh Bac (Bac Ninh Province) after his failed 
uprising in Thang Long.  However, his arrival was not welcomed by General 
Nguyen Canh Thuoc.  This forced Le Chieu Thong and his followers to move 
to Bao Loc in the Lam Dong province.  This time they were well received by 
Nguyen Trong Linh.  However, Le Chieu Thong’s hope to launch a series of 
resistance against the Tay  Son brothers could not be realised because of the 
lack of financial resouces.68
He then headed to Nghe An and Thanh Hoa.  Over there, he tried to 
gather supporters in the hope of fighting his enemies but his effort ended in 
disaster when Dinh Tich Nhuong, a dignitary who had been in the service of 
eight generations of the Le dynasty, betrayed him. Dinh Tich Nhuong informed 
the Tay Son brothers of his movements.  Finally, Le Chieu Thong sought 
refuge in Bac Giang.  His queen and other family members, fled to Longzhou 
in Guangxi to seek political asylum from China.69 At this juncture, China 
began to place serious focus on the unrest that was happening in Vietnam in its 
position as the patron of Vietnam, which was its tributary state.  The reaction 
of China at the beginning of the Tay Son brothers’ rebellion was more cautious 
as they tried to avoid direct involvement in the political turmoil in Vietnam.
Concluding Remarks
 
Any undesirable political, economic or social deviation from the norm often 
means misery for the people who have to cope with the demands that go 
beyond the limits of the central government or local authorities to control. 
When the situation is no longer bearable, the reaction of the people in various 
forms of resistance will happen.  The Tay Son Brothers Uprising in Vietnam 
discussed in this paper is a case in point.  It is the manifestation of popular 
discontent against the depravity of the existing reign.  The rebellion was 
considered legitimate according to the principles of political ideology.  The Tay 
Son brothers managed to legitimize their revolt as being mandated by heaven 
in view of the injustice, debauchery and depravity caused by the families of 
the Nguyen and Trinh rulers.  In fact, the governments which they overthrew 
were mired in appalling corruption scandals which brought suffering and 
hardships to the people.  Thus, the concept of a mandate from heaven played a 
vital role in the uprising especially when the Tay Son Brothers claimed to put 
the interests of the people first.  To them, the main function of a ruler was to 
safeguard the interests of his people.  When a ruler went against the interests 
of his people, heaven would confiscate his right to be in power. It is clear that 
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here the concept of mandate from heaven is given a moral dimension.  In sum, 
the Tay Son brothers’ victory in deposing and replacing the Nguyen and Trinh 
rulers was clearly through invoking the will and command of heaven to defend 
and justify their deeds.
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